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The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of economic openness on the vertical 
structure of the public sector within a country. To tackle this issue we set up a simple 
theoretical model of fiscal federalism, where both central and local public spending enter 
the objective functions of both a central government and an aggregate local public sector, 
accommodating a wide range of behaviours. The degree of economic openness is 
assumed to erode central tax revenues and through this channel to affect the size of 
central spending, the size of grants paid to local governments and the optimal amount of 
local public spending. Consequences on the degree of decentralization are investigated. 
The main findings are that for a large subset of parameters an increase in economic 
openness leads to: a) a lower level of central government expenditures; b) a lower level of 
general government expenditures; c) a higher level of local taxation; d) a higher degree of 
public sector decentralization. 
 
Keywords: openness, decentralization, fiscal federalism, public sector, government size. 
JEL Classification: H77, H50, H11. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
§ Financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education (PRIN) is gratefully acknowledged. We 
wish to thank participants to the II ECINEQ Meeting (Berlin 2007), to University of Padua 
Internal Seminar (March 2008), ECOMOD Conference 2008 (Berlin), IIPF Annual Conference 
2008 (Maastricht) for useful and stimulating comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
* Università di Urbino “ Carlo Bo”, DEMQ – email: paolo.liberati@econ.uniurb.it.  
** Università di Padova – email: antonio.sciala@unipd.it.    2
1. Introduction 
 
The theory of fiscal federalism provides a number of explanations of why governments 
should be articulated on different levels. The most popular theories focus on 
heterogeneous preferences across localities (Oates, 1972), on the need to enforce 
competition in the use of public resources (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Breton, 1987; 
Salmon, 1987), on the purpose of preserving the functioning of markets (Weingast, 1995; 
Qian and Weingast, 1997) or on the necessity to assure a “fiscal correspondence” 
between political and economic jurisdictions (Casella and Frey, 1992; Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1996). 
Even though those theories differ with respect to the objective function of the public 
sector, they share some common features that may help interpreting the motivation and 
the results of our paper. 
A first common feature of all theories is that a decentralised structure – under certain 
conditions – may be more effective than a unique central government, an outcome that is 
mostly determined by greater mobility of economic resources at local level in response to 
undesirable public policies (an effect that is rooted in the “voting by feet” argument by 
Tiebout, 1956). Such a mobility, in the standard theory, would assure homogeneous 
preferences within local governments; while it would reduce tax exploitation 
opportunities by part of “monopolistic” central governments in the theories of 
competitive federalism. 
A second common feature concerns the institutional role of local governments, called 
to ‘remedy’ some imperfections in the functioning of the central authority. In the standard 
theory, local governments solve for the central government imperfect knowledge of local 
preferences. In competitive federalism, local governments serve the purpose of limiting 
the exploitative nature of the central government. 
A third common feature is that any group of theories – either implicitly or explicitly – 
subsumes a vertical structure of the public sector. Yet, this structure may differ according 
to the objective function of the public sector. In a Tiebout-type world, local expenditures 
and benefit-type taxation must meet differentiated preferences, and local governments 
should be sufficiently small to guarantee an adequate sorting process, while wide 
differences between taxes paid and benefits received are removed by mobility. The 
vertical structure of the public sector is therefore built upon the existence of ‘local public 
goods’ and by consumers’ willingness to pay for them. Within the theories of competitive 
federalism, instead, those expenditures and taxes that promote horizontal and vertical 
competition should be decentralised. This might imply that local governments should 
manage elastic tax bases, as taxes on immovable factors may simply replace central tax 
exploitation with local ones. 
A fourth feature, most important for our paper, is that all theories fail to embody the 
possibility that the degree of economic integration may affect the vertical structure of the 
public sector.
1 Either benevolent or self-interested, the central government of many fiscal 
federalism theories rules over a mainly ‘domestic’ economy, regardless of the pressures 
that may arise from the international context. In other words, the theories of fiscal 
federalism do not properly take into account that, ceteris paribus, more open economies 
may end up with a vertical structure of the public sector that does not necessarily coincide 
with that of a relatively more closed economy. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Brennan and Buchanan (1980), the empirical evidence provided by Oates 
(1985) for the Leviathan hypothesis, the recent empirical evidence provided by Stein (1999) and 
the survey of the literature in Rodden (2003).   3
On the other hand, while the theories of fiscal federalism are rather “closed” in nature, 
the studies on the impact of economic openness on government size are rather “unitary”, 
focusing mostly on the effects of the public sector as a whole without modelling any 
intergovernmental relations (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998 to quote two popular 
contributions on the relationships between government size and economic openness).
2 
The interest in merging fiscal federalism theories and the impact of economic 
integration on public finance variables finds its foundations in the theory of international 
tax competition and on the future of ‘Nation State’ (Schulze and Ursprung, 1999). The 
main message from both strands of literature is that public sectors may be somewhat 
constrained in the use of both taxes and public expenditures when there is a high degree 
of mobility of tax bases and the consequent erosion of tax revenues. Tax revenues may 
decrease (or increase slowly), the tax burden may reallocate from more mobile to less 
mobile tax bases, large redistributive programs are less easily implemented and large 
welfare states are increasingly difficult to maintain. It is therefore highly unlikely that 
these “big” changes that economic integration is alleged to generate may leave the 
vertical structure of public sectors unaffected. 
This paper addresses this issue by using economic integration and its alleged impact 
on tax revenue as a way to “open” fiscal federalism theories to external constraints. This 
may contribute to understand that the vertical structure of public expenditures, the size of 
aggregate spending and the degree of decentralization in any given country may well 
depend on how economic integration “erodes” national resources. It is worth stressing 
that this issue has been so far overlooked by existing theories of fiscal federalism, and 
that this paper makes a step in the direction of highlighting that external constraints 
matter for both central and local government behaviours.
3 
In order to tackle this issue, we set up a simple theoretical model that embodies a 
variety of both central and local governments attitudes towards local and central public 
spending, respectively. In this sense, our framework is general enough to encompass, as 
special cases, both self-interested own-budget maximizer (Niskanen-type) and welfare-
maximizer governments.
4 
In our model, the Central Government (CG) decides the level of central public 
expenditures and the level of transfers to LGs subject to a revenue constraint that 
becomes tighter the higher the degree of economic openness, assumed to erode central tax 
revenues. On the other hand, Local Governments (LGs) set the level of autonomous 
public spending, financing it by central grants and local lump-sum taxes.  
The main findings – for a significant subset of parameters – are that an increase in 
economic openness leads to a lower level of general government expenditures, a higher 
level of local taxation, a lower level of central government spending and a higher degree 
of public sector decentralization. 
                                                 
2 For an extensive review, see Schulze and Ursprung (1999). See, among many, Garrett (1996, 
1998a, 1998b and 1999),  Quinn (1997), Rodrik (1997), Swank  (1998), Hallerberg and Basinger 
(1998), Iversen and Cusack (2000), Grubert (2001), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Swank (2002), 
Sanz and Velázquez (2003), Dreher (2003),  Slemrod (2004), Garen and Trask (2005), Liberati 
(2007). 
3 As stated in a comment to Buchanan (1995), in the presence of an open environment “national 
governments find themselves in the approximate position of a province or a state or a canton vis-à-
vis the national economy in a federal state. The Tiebout mechanism comes into play…because the 
national government loses its traditional power to rule over society and regulate the economy”. 
4 Given the purpose of the paper, the federalist structure of the public sector is taken as given, 
without pursuing its microfoundation .   4
A review of the literature is addressed in Section 2, while the model is discussed in 




2. The relation between openness and government size 
 
Even though the relationship between economic openness and decentralisation is 
relatively unexplored in the prevailing literature, there are some useful insights that can 
be learned from different strands of theoretical and empirical studies that have 
investigated those topics either jointly or in isolation. In what follows, we propose both a 




2.1. The extension of the compensation hypothesis 
 
A possible nexus between openness and fiscal federalism straightforwardly arises from 
the extension of the hypothesis suggested by Rodrik (1998) to local governments. He 
argued that increasing external economy’s exposure may lead to more demand for public 
expenditures to compensate for increasing external risk (macroeconomic volatility, 
asymmetric shocks), a process that has become popular as the compensation hypothesis 
(e.g., Swank, 2002).
5 Since this kind of insurance function is thought to be best served by 
centralised fiscal arrangements (e.g. Oates, 1972), the consequential outcome is that 
globalisation should increase the size of central governments and reduce that of local 
ones, especially if regions are specialised in production.
6 On the other hand, economic 
integration may increase the cost of stabilisation policies – i.e. the cost associated to 
counter-cyclical policies – as part of the intended effects can be vanished by factor 
mobility, a feature that would further push towards centralised policies. 
 
 
2.2. The emphasis on the costs of secession 
 
The second explanation stems from a strand of research suggesting that economic 
integration may reduce the cost of secession by part of small regions and provide for less 
benefits to larger countries (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg, 
1998). According to this view, “political separatism should be associated with increasing 
economic integration” (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, p.1041). In other terms, exit threats 
might become more credible (and cheaper) in an integrated world than in an autarchic 
world.  
Now, if fiscal decentralisation is interpreted as a backstop to secession (for example to 
avoid inefficiency costs associated to secession as in Bolton and Roland, 1997) more 
economic integration should lead to more decentralised countries. The reason is that 
central governments will be willing to “pay” more to local governments to avoid 
secession – for example, by increasing transfers or by devolving expenditure and taxation 
power to them. However, as Garrett and Rodden (2003) pointed out, central governments 
may try to “buy” loyalty of voters – especially in would-be breakaway regions – by direct 
                                                 
5 The role of asymmetric shocks in increasing regional demand for insurance was already pointed 
out in Persson and Tabellini (1996a) and (1996b). 
6 See also Garrett and Rodden (2003).   5
spending rather than by transfers, by this way recovering the possibility that economic 
integration would increase (more) the size of central governments.  
The authors, however, seem to disregard the possibility that “local voters” might be 
more effectively bought by increasing either the size of – possibly unconditional – 
transfers or the amount of taxes devolved to local territories (at least if one assumes that 
local citizens are better informed about what happens at local rather than at central level 
or that less rents are dissipated at local level).
7  
A notable contribution on this issue is by Stegarescu (2004), who argues that 
economic integration may have triggered the recent process of fiscal decentralisation in 
OECD and EU countries. The theoretical model contains several interesting points, the 
most relevant for our analysis being the dependence of both preferences for national 
public goods and per capita regional output on the degree of economic integration. He 
shows that complementarities between local and national public goods leads to an 
increase of the total supply of public goods (central + local) when economic integration 
increases. At the same time, the theoretical effect on the optimal degree of 
decentralisation would be ambiguous, yet a positive relationship between openness and 





2.3. Openness as a fiscal discipline device 
 
A third explanation tend to highlight the role of globalisation as a fiscal discipline device. 
In particular, as suggested by de Mello (2005), globalisation can impose harder budget 
constraints on decentralised governments. By this way, it would reduce the “deficit bias” 
empirically observed in more decentralised countries – originated by either implicit or 
explicit bail-out guarantees from the central governments
9 – and favour the 
implementation of a market-preserving federalism (e.g. ; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Qian 
and Roland, 1998). 
There are two debatable points in this interpretation. The first is intrinsic to the model 
by de Mello (2005), in which globalisation has a direct impact on local budgets, but only 
a mediate effect on the budget of the central government, a feature which remains rather 
unexplained. The second is that some theories of fiscal federalism suggest that 
decentralisation may be a discipline device by itself, through an increase of both 
horizontal and vertical competition among government levels.
10 Arguing that more 
decentralised countries tend to have a “deficit bias” – and that economic integration may 
remedy it – is a direct challenge to the benefits of decentralisation highlighted by the 
theories of competitive federalism. 
                                                 
7 On this latter point, see Ferejohn (1999). 
8 See also Verdier and Breen (2001) and van Houten (2003), the first showing that fiscal 
centralisation is positively related to financial openness; the second showing that economic 
integration has not a clear effect on decentralisation. 
9 See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1998). 
10 In particular those theories evoking some kind of competitive federalism. See, for all, Buchanan 
and Brennan (1980) and Salmon (1987). But see Oates (1985) and Ferejohn (1999) pointing to the 
fact that local voters may ask for more spending rather than less, to the extent that they perceive 
that less public money is dissipated in rents by local governments. More recently, Wilson and 
Janeba (2005) show how local governments may play a role in reducing the harmful effects of 
externalities in a tax competition setting.   6
Furthermore, it has been recently shown by Besfamille and Lockwood (2004) that 
hard budget constraints for sub-national governments may not be desirable, as under 
some circumstances socially efficient projects may not be undertaken. In other words, 
fiscal discipline may not be socially optimal. 
Other contributions (e.g. Jin and Zou, 2002) suggest that vertical imbalances may lead 
to higher subnational, national and aggregate governments, presumably because central 
governments pay transfers to localities.
11 In this context, however, there is no analysis of 
whether economic integration may discipline this inefficiency. 
But perhaps the most compelling case for this point of view indirectly arises from a 
comment to Buchanan (1995). While describing the main features of competitive 
federalism, it is argued that “the monopoly power of unitary governments, as well as the 
common pool problem of federalist politics, can be alleviated to the extent that free 
movements of resources allows resource owners to move away from excessive taxes and 
regulations”. It is indeed a common point of all theories of competitive federalism, that 
the institution of “federalism” may facilitate the exit option by part of individuals and 
firms dissatisfied with tax and expenditure policies, compared with the monolithic central 
government. In the same vein, increased economic integration may play the same role at a 




2.4. The role of opportunistic behaviour 
 
A fourth explanation is based on the existence of opportunistic behaviour by part of either 
of the government levels involved in the process. In particular, the existing literature has 
focused on the case where central governments may offload some fraction of total public 
expenditures to local governments.  
Economic integration, for example, may increase the marginal efficiency cost for 
central governments of pursuing redistributive aims (through an increased elasticity of tax 
bases). To some extent, the reason is the same as that predicted by the Tiebout (1956) 
model when perfect mobility is assumed. In this latter case, redistribution is a hardly 
tenable function for local governments and unstable equilibria may originate.
12 
In the same vein, in more open countries, central governments are likely to face high 
mobile tax bases and additional distortions in taxing less mobile tax factors. This would 
point to redistributive expenditures (but also to redistributive taxes) as the most at risk at 
high levels of economic integration.
13  
However, since cutting redistributive expenditures is a politically costly activity for 
central governments, one possible strategy would be to decentralise. Economic 
integration may therefore push towards more decentralisation on a political ground, 
                                                 
11 See Rodden (2003) who argue that when local expenditures are financed with local own taxes 
the size of welfare spending is lower. Hicks and Swank (1992), Schmidt (1996), Castles (1998) 
and Swank (2002) also provide empirical evidence of a negative relation between fiscal federalism 
and the size of welfare spending. 
12 See also Stigler (1957). 
13 Note that this argument may be interpreted as the counterpart of the compensation hypothesis. 
This latter predicts that there is a larger demand of public expenditures, but this does not 
necessarily entail that this demand can be satisfied by a larger supply if there are constraints on the 
use of public finance variables.   7
something that can be referred to here as the shifting hypothesis.
14 Sáez (2001) has indeed 
pointed out that central governments may try to offload public expenditures to local 
governments without a commensurate increase in tax revenue (i.e. central governments 
shift budget deficits), which is likely to lead to smaller aggregate government size. 
Garrett and Rodden (2000) argue that strategic behaviour may be followed by central 
governments facing increasing pressures to maintain fiscal balance, by attempting to cut 
expenditures by offloading expenditures and deficits to local governments.  
Two things are worth noting. First, the previous arguments by de Mello (2005) seem 
to be turned on their head. In this latter case, openness could remedy the fact that more 
decentralised countries have higher budget deficits. In Garrett and Rodden (2000), 
openness may induce central governments to shift budget deficits to local governments. 
Second, if one is ready to assume that the most powerful pressure to maintain fiscal 
balance comes from capital markets
15, the argument by Garrett and Rodden (2000) that 
fiscal balance pressures give incentives to central governments to offload public 
expenditures to local governments ends up to be the argument advanced in this paper that 






3. The model 
 
“There are local expenditures that, if particularly useful to the members of a community, 
give benefits also to the central government; and there are central expenditures that are 
particularly useful for some local communities” (English translation from Nitti F. 
(1912), Scienza delle Finanze, p.950, IV edition). 
 
The following model will set up a simple theoretical framework to show one basic point 
and some by-products. The basic point is that higher economic openness, assumed to 
erode central tax revenue, may lead in most cases to larger decentralisation. The by-
product is that this may occur combining various behavioural opportunities of both 
central and local governments, i.e. various ways in which central and local spending may 
be deemed useful to other government levels. 
In what follows, we will discuss first the behaviour of local governments, then the 




3.1. The Local Government decision problem 
 
Consider a simplified structure of territorial organization in which there are a Central 
Government (CG) and an aggregate local public sector. The central government spends 
an amount g  for overall purposes, while the local sector spends an amount gL for local 
purposes. 
                                                 
14 The relevance of this shifting hypothesis is not new in the economic literature. Its origin can be 
traced back to the literature on regulation authorities. See, for example, Mitnick (1980). 
15 This hypothesis is known as the domestic balance hypothesis. See Swank (2002). 
16 Note that the reduction of welfare spending, for example, may also be the outcome of a process 
in which expenditures are first delegated without corresponding tax powers and then reduced if 
central governments are not available to fully finance them with grants and local governments 
have insufficient resources to afford them.   8
The local aggregate government  maximizes the following objective function with 
respect to local public expenditures: 
 
WL =αln gL +βg ( )+ 1−α ( )ln Y −T −tL ( )       ( 1 )  
 
subject to the budget constraint gL = tL +b, where tL is a local lump-sum tax, b is a 
lump-sum grant from the central government and Y  is total income.
17 Population in each 
region is fixed and no migration is allowed between the regions. Debt issue is also not 
allowed to local governments. 
Of particular interest, in (1),  1 0 ≤ ≤ β  is a parameter measuring the attitude of the 
local politician towards central public spending. Varying the level of β makes this 
approach consistent with a wide spectrum of local politicians’ behaviour. The extreme 
β =0, for example, would be consistent with both own-budget maximizer local 
governments (Niskanen-type) or with an ‘informed’ median voter model who considers 
central and local spending two separate outcomes attached to different levels of political 
responsibilities.
18 ‘Information’ would imply that local voters would better assess the 
performance of local politicians for what they directly spend and not for what is spent by 
central governments on their account.
19  
Alternatively,  β >0 would be again consistent with the median voter framework or 
with a welfare-maximising perspective, where politician’s objective function reflects 
either citizens or median voter’s preferences on central and local expenditures, 
characterised by some degree of substitution in producing benefits, whose extreme is 
represented by β=1, i.e. by the case in which one euro of central public spending gives 
the same utility as one euro of local public spending. 
Finally, α is a parameter of preference; α=0 means that local governments do not 
assign any weight to public expenditures; at the same time private income Y, net of the 
central revenue T and of the local tax burden tL, is all that matters. The opposite holds 
true when  1 = α . 
In this framework grants b are taken as given by local governments, which means that 
the decisional process on the appropriate amount of grants is concentrated in the hands of 
the central government.
20 It follows that local taxation must fill the gap between local 
spending and grants, i.e. tL = gL −b.  




 WL =αln gL +βg ( )+ 1−α ( )ln Y −T +b−gL ( )      ( 1 a )  
 
                                                 
17 In this version, grants from the central government are assumed uniform among regions. A 
natural extension would be to assume a regionally differentiated transfer, such as an equalisation 
transfer to compensate differences of potential tax revenues. 
18 This would be consistent, for example, with the observed practice of disjoint voting in national 
and local elections by part of the same voter. 
19 This argument is consistent with Brennan and Buchanan (1980), once their statement on the tax 
policy perspective is transposed to one of public spending policy. 
20 In practice, the amount of transfers paid by the central government might be the outcome of a 
bargaining process. However, the central government power on this setting process is usually 
stronger, not least because in many legislative framework, the rules governing grants may be 
changed unilaterally by the central government. See, for example, the discussion about the vertical 






3.2. The Central Government decision problem 
 
Consider now the problem faced by the Central Government. It has two choice variables, 
central public expenditures g and grants b to local governments. The objective function is 




 W =γln g+θgL ( )+ 1−γ ( )ln Y −T −tL ( )          (2) 
 
γ  is a parameter describing central government’s preferences, playing the same role as 
α  in the local government’s objective function. Also, analogously to the previous case, θ 
has, for the central government, the same meaning as β in the case of local government. 
Various values of θ accommodate for different central government attitudes towards 
local government expenditures. Again, with  0 = θ , the central government maximises 
own public spending (i.e. the central government is self-interested), while with  1 = θ  
central and local spending gives to national politicians the same utility (i.e. the central 
government is welfare maximiser). 
The central government has the following budget constraint: 
 
g+b=T −ω             ( 3 )  
 
where T is the central government exogenous tax revenue. The peculiarity of the budget 
constraint (3) is that the central tax revenue, for a given level of tax rates, is assumed to 
be negatively affected by ω, measuring the impact of economic openness on tax revenue. 
For the sake of simplicity, define this term as the ‘openness impact’. 
The meaning of this parameter is simple. A given level of tax rates is assumed to yield 
more tax revenue in a closed economy than in an open one. If the economy is closed, tax 
revenue is T. If it is open, it is T −ω. By assumption, however, ω<<T , i.e. economic 
openness does not make the tax revenue to disappear and its impact is significantly below 
the total amount of tax revenue. 
It is worth noting that ω is here introduced in a very general way as a factor of 
erosion of central government tax revenue that is not under control of central political 
authorities. On the one hand, this is a simplified way of dealing with economic openness, 
one that does not require to model economic interrelations between countries, as it focus 
on the internal consequences of the action of external factors.
21 On the other hand, this 
modelling can accommodate the action of every “eroding factor”, of which openness is 
thought to be one of the most prominent examples in recent times. 
There are a number of arguments supporting the hypothesis maintained in the budget 
constraint (3). Just to focus on relatively recent contributions, the possibility that 
increasing economic openness may shrink tax bases (and tax revenues for the same level 
of tax rates) has been put forward by Tanzi (1995 and 2002) and by the literature on 
international tax competition. One of the predicted consequences is a relatively more 
                                                 
21 To some extent, it amounts to assume that every country is openness-taker, i.e. it is too small to 
affect the degree of economic integration by acting in isolation.   10
heavy taxation of less mobile tax bases. On the empirical side, however, measuring the 
impact of either trade openness or capital openness (or both) on the level and composition 
of tax revenues does not give clear-cut results, but the erosion of tax revenue is an event 
often supported by data.
22 
In our context, the simplest interpretation is that total tax revenue in an open economy 
is likely to be lower than it would be with the same tax rates were the economy perfectly 
closed, which is in fact a mild assumption. By analogy, the openness of the economy is 
here assumed to affect total tax revenue in the same way as the openness of the economy 
affects the level of national income by allowing some consumption to “fly away” towards 
imported goods in the standard Keynesian multiplier. For the sake of clarity, therefore, 
we will not discuss whether the openness of the economy causes a reduction of total tax 
revenue in general terms; we simply assume that – for a given level of tax rates – the 
openness of the economy will tend to reduce the amount of resources available to central 
government.
23 This also provides some justification to our assumption that central tax 
revenue is left exogenous, as the main focus of our model is to investigate what happens 
by assuming that tax revenue is eroded and not to investigate whether tax revenue is 
actually eroded. 
Note further that the central government makes decision about the level of public 
expenditures by considering the aggregate disposable income (net of central and local 
taxes) in each local government. This latter factor introduces in (2) a simplified way of 
how the central government “care” for local governments’ well-being. Indeed, even in the 
self-interested scenario (θ=0), net incomes of citizens represents an implicit limit to the 
expansion of the central public sector, in the sense that the ‘implicit cost’ of higher g and 
lower  b would be a lower disposable income. Nevertheless, when γ =1, the central 




3.3. Federalist equilibrium 
 
3.3.1. The optimum solutions for local governments 
 
Local and central governments maximize their own objective function with respect to 
their own policy instruments, taking as given the decisions of the other government level. 
Consider first the local government. The optimal level of local public expenditures can 
be determined by solving  ∂WL
∂gL
=0, from which: 
 
ˆ  g  L =α Y −T +b [ ]− 1−α ( )βg           (4) 
 
ˆ  t  L = ˆ  g  L −b=α Y −T [ ]− 1−α ( )βg+b ( )         ( 5 )  
 
                                                 
22 Among the main contributions to this topic, see Garrett (1995), Garrett and Mitchell (2001), 
Quinn (1997), Swank (1998 and 2002), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Adam and Kammas 
(2007), Dreher (2005), Swank and Steinmo (2002), Winner (2005), Krogstrup (2003), Gastaldi 
(2008). 
23 As already observed in the previous paragraph, support to this idea also comes from theories of 
competitive federalism. See Buchanan (1995).   11
Equation (4) gives the optimal level of local public expenditures for given levels of grants 
and central spending. Note that the presence of central spending reduces the optimum 
level of local ones. This is the main effect of introducing both expenditure levels (central 
and local) in both objective functions. 
The attitude towards central and local public spending shown by the corresponding 
government levels becomes therefore crucial. For a given level of grants, the optimum 
level of local spending would be higher when β=0, i.e. when the local government is 
own-spending maximiser. For β>0, instead, optimal local spending may be lower, as in 
this case central government spending “serve” also local government purposes that are 
“recognised” by the objective function of local politicians.
24 
Equation (5) gives the optimal level of local taxes. In this case, the interpretation is 
straightforward: local taxes fund the fraction of public expenditures that is not financed 




3.3.2. The optimum solutions for central government 
 
Consider now the central government. The optimal level of central public expenditures 
can be obtained by the Lagrangian function of the maximization problem: 
 
L λ,g,b ( )=W +λ T −ω−g−b ( )           
 



















=0⇔g+b=T −ω            
 





Y −T −gL +b () −θgL         ( 8 )  
 
Substituting equation (8) into the central government budget constraint (3) and solving 
for b yields the optimal level of grants: 
 
ˆ  b =T + γ + 1−γ ( ) θ [ ]gL −γY − 1−γ ( ) ω         ( 9 )  
 
Finally, substituting (9) into (8) gives the optimal level of central public expenditures: 
                                                 
24 For example, optimum local spending on health may be lower if the central government 
provides basic health infrastructures. However, if the local government aims at maximizing local 
spending, it might well duplicate central government spending, ending up with a higher level of 
local spending.   12
 
ˆ  g =γ Y −ω ( )− γ + 1−γ ( ) θ [ ]gL         ( 1 0 )  
 
Note that the openness impact plays a direct role in shaping both the optimal levels of 
central expenditures and grants. Also, both depends on the optimal level of local public 
expenditures  L g . Equation (9) and (10) can therefore be interpreted as reaction functions 
of central government to local government decisions. In the same vein, equation (4) can 
be interpreted as the reaction function of local government to central government 
decisions. Therefore, solving the system of equations (4), (9) and (10), gives the 
equilibrium of the model for grants, central and local government expenditures: 
 
g
* = γ −αΓ
1−ΑΓ





















ω       (11b) 
 
gL
* = α +
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ω     (11c) 
 
where  ( )θ γ γ − + = Γ 1  and  A =α + 1−α ( )β . Note that  γ θ = Γ ⇒ = 0 a n d  
β =0⇒Α=α. It is worth noting that in order to have  0
* > g  in equilibrium, it is 




θ, for which a sufficient (not necessary) condition is γ ≥α. We 
will assume this condition throughout the paper. The equilibrium level of transfers b
* and 
local spending gL





4. Comparative statics 
 
Comparative statics may help disentangle the impact of economic openness on public 
finance variables and on their distribution among government levels, which is the main 
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25 What is required is the following sufficient condition on the numerators 
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It is also worth defining the difference between the change of local government spending 
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*  as the degree of decentralization given by the ratio between local 
spending and total spending  G
* = g
*+gL
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In order to discuss the main implications of the model, it is worth distinguishing among 
sub-cases, according to the behavioural attitudes of both central and local governments. 





Following an increase of the openness impact, central government spending always 






















>0 always holds. The increase of local taxation 
follows from the budget constraint. 
 
 
Proposition 1 is a general outcome of the model. Whenever central tax revenue is eroded, 
the best response of the central government is to reduce public spending, regardless of the 
attitude of both central and local politicians towards public spending realised by the other 
government level. β and θ, indeed, may affect the size of the response, but not its 
direction, which is unequivocally negative. This is a first challenge to the compensation   14
hypothesis discussed in paragraph 2.1. The size of the central government decreases in 




4.1. The case β =0 
 
Consider now some results specific to the assumptions made on both β and θ. Consider 
first the case in which central government spending does not play any role in the 
objective function of the local public sector.  In other words, central spending gives no 




In the case β =0 and for any 0<θ<1: 
 
a)  local public spending decreases; 
b) total public spending decreases; 
c)  grants from central government decrease;  
d) the degree of decentralization increases. 
 









<0, for part a); 
 
Since central government spending always decreases (Proposition 1) and local 













































⎟ > 0, for part d), using the assumption γ≥α. 
 
 
Remark 1  
 
Proposition 1 holds irrespective of the value of θ. Note that even when the central 
government is completely selfish (θ=0), the degree of decentralization increases. 
This occurs because grants from central to local government decrease less than 
what would cause a reduction of local spending larger than that of central spending. 
A reduction of grants, indeed, would imply an increase of local taxation, which in 
turn reduces disposable income. Since this latter variable enter the central 
government’s objective function, this explains why even a selfish central   15
government may prefer not to cut grants significantly. This may explain, for 
example, why grants from central to local governments are a persistent feature of 
apparently wide different models of fiscal federalism. Besides complementing a 
structural insufficiency of tax sources at local level, grants may serve the scope of 
better ‘satisfying’ central government’s preferences for local disposable incomes. 
 
The case of selfish local governments, therefore, gives full account of the common 
opinion that one possible impact of economic openness might be a shrink of the general 
government size (part c)). Our model, in this case, makes a step further. It explains that 
when the central tax revenue is eroded, the final outcome of that shrink is to increase the 
share of local government expenditures on total spending (i.e. the degree of 





4.2.  The case β>0 
 
For the purpose of simplifying the discussion of this case, it is worth distinguishing two 




4.2.1. A central government with θ=0 
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When grants increase (following an increase of the openness impact), local public 
spending will increase and will increase more than grants. When grants decrease, 
local public spending may either increase or decrease. 
 
Proof: It is convenient to start from what happens to grants. Replacing θ=0 into 
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. The sign of this expression depends on the 
numerator. In particular, using (17), α<αγ ⇒ ∂b
*
∂ω




Now, consider the following relation, obtained by replacing optimal solutions in 
(4) and taking the derivative with respect to ω: 
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We know from Proposition 1 that  ∂g
*
∂ω
<0, therefore the second term is always 
positive.
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>0, i.e. local spending increases more than grants (see 
Proposition 2). Conversely, α>αγ ⇒ ∂b
*
∂ω













Following an increase of the openness impact, the aggregate size of the public 

























Following an increase of the impact of economic openness, the degree of 



























⎟ . From Proposition 5, the second 




>0. When  ∂gL
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<0, one has to replace the equilibrium values of total and 
                                                 




< 0 does not require γ ≥α.   17
local public spending into the general form (16). With θ=0, after manipulation, 
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⎭  ⎪ 
. It is easy to 
show that all terms in round brackets are positive, therefore  ∂D
*
∂ω
>0 always holds. 
 
 
Proposition  4 highlights a number of issues. First, a selfish central government may 
either increase or decrease grants to local governments. Even a selfish government, 
indeed, gets some utility from disposable income (net of local taxes). Reducing grants, 
given the local budget constraint, would mean to increase local taxation and to reduce 
local disposable income, which has a negative feedback on the central government 
objective function. Therefore, even though local public spending has no ‘value’ for the 
central government, it may prefer to pay grants rather than to cause an increase of local 
taxation. 
Second, when grants decrease, local public spending is more likely to increase when β 
is larger, i.e. when there is a large positive attitude towards central government spending. 
This would appear counterintuitive, but it is not if one thinks that a reduction of central 
government spending, with larger β’s, would cause a larger loss in local ‘welfare’. This 
loss needs to be increasingly compensated by local spending, which also compensates the 
‘welfare’ loss due to the increase of local taxation caused by the reduction of grants (see 
Proposition  2). Technically, there is no shifting of resources from central to local 
governments (grants decrease), yet the increase of local spending is still an admissible 
outcome, implying that the vertical structure of the public sector would change. 
Third, local spending increases more than grants – when both increase – which gives 
account of the observed ‘bandwagon effect’. Combining this result with that in 
Proposition 1, leads to the conclusion that more economic integration may reshape the 
vertical structure of the public sector, with the central government spending less and local 
governments spending more also using more grants. Put in other words, the vertical 
structure of the public sector would change and this occurs through a shifting of 
expenditures from central to local governments. This finding, for example, may explain 
why a large number of empirical studies on the relation between economic openness and 
the size of the public sector show apparently contradictory results (either a positive or a 
negative relationship), mostly depending on which definition of public sector is used 
(central, local or general governments). 
Proposition 5 gives interesting insights on the consequences of economic openness on 
the aggregate size of the public sector. When both central and local public spending 
decrease, the result is obvious. There are cases, however, in which a decrease of central 
public spending is associated to an increase of local public spending. The negative sign 
on the total size of the public sector, however, would imply that local public spending 
increases by less than the size of the reduction of central public spending. In other words, 
and in absolute terms, the shrink in the central public sector always outperforms the 
enlargement of the local public sectors. As it stands, our model gives no analytical 
support to the compensation hypothesis in the case of a selfish central government, 
regardless of the attitude of the local public sector towards central spending. 
Proposition 6 is also insightful. Given the definition of D, in those cases where a 
shrink of the aggregate size of the public sector is associated to an increase of local public 
spending, the degree of decentralization unambiguously increases. This would imply that 
the most likely reaction to the erosion of the central tax revenue flows through a reduction   18
of central public spending, a shrink of the aggregate size of the public sector and an 
enlargement of local public spending, causing an increase of the share of total public 
spending managed by local governments. This result would support the hypothesis that 
economic openness, by reducing the ability of central governments to raise sufficient tax 
revenue to finance large amount of expenditures, would both cut expenditures under its 
own responsibility and then delegates local governments to take responsibility of 
additional public spending with additional local taxes. Grants, in this case, play the role 
of mitigating heavy increases of local taxation in the case in which central governments 
‘care’ for disposable incomes. 
Local spending, however, may decrease in response to an increase of the impact of 
economic openness, but recall that this is less likely if local governments have a larger 
positive attitude towards central spending, clarifying once again that the impact of 
economic openness strongly depends on the behavioural context in which central and 
local governments operate. Nevertheless, the degree of decentralisation still increases. 
We think that this is an important result, as it may add to theories of fiscal federalism 
those cases in which decentralisation is the optimal response to exogenous shocks of 
either macroeconomic or institutional framework. Our hypothesis is that once perturbed 
by an exogenous factor (i.e. economic openness), the vertical structure of the public 




4.2.2. A central government with θ>0 
 
In this paragraph, it will be discussed the most general case in which both β>0 and 
θ>0, in order to investigate how a positive attitude of the central government towards 
local public spending may affect the outcome discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
 





Conclusions from Proposition 4 still holds. However, larger θs makes an increase 
in grants more likely as well as an increase in local public spending. 
 









⎟  . By definition, 




⇒αΓ >αγ. Compared with θ=0 and for a 
given  β, this makes more likely α<α Γ ⇒ ∂b
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Following an increase of the openness impact, the aggregate size of the public 


























Following an increase of the openness impact, the degree of decentralisation 
increases. 
 
Proof: In this case, the general formulation for the impact of economic openness 
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The sign of the previous expression depends on the sign of the expression inside 
the square brackets. Using  1−α () β−α
2 () Γ= A−α−α
2 ( )Γ, after manipulation, one 
can get  2γ− 1+α () αΓ [] . By assumption γ > αΓ and 2 > 1+α ( ), therefore the square 







Proposition 4bis has a straightforward intuition. When local spending has a direct impact 
on the objective function of the central government, it is more likely that local spending 
compensates for the reduction of central spending dictated by an increase of the openness 
impact. Note that the compensating function of local spending is an increasing function of 









>0. This process, in our model, 
would also be stimulated by the increase of grants paid by the central government, whose 
aim, as before, is to avoid large increases of local taxation to finance local spending. 
Proposition 5bis reveals that the contraction of the aggregate public sector is still the 
unique outcome following an increase of the impact of economic openness. However, this 
is associated to an increase of the degree of decentralisation. To this purpose, it is worth 
considering the following Proposition: 
 




The marginal effect of increasing economic openness on the degree of public 














Proposition 7 points to the fact that as θ increases, the central government preferences for 
public expenditures adjusted for the attitude towards local spending (i.e. Γ) increases. 
This implies that, albeit negative, the marginal impact of economic openness on total 
public spending will be lower. Furthermore, the magnitude of the reduction of the 
marginal impact on aggregate spending will be higher than the one (positive) of the 











decentralisation increases at smaller rates when θ increases. The opposite holds true with 
reference to β, i.e. decentralisation increases at faster rates when β increases. 
Once again, this gives account of the fact that the degree of fiscal federalism will be 
driven by the existing international and behavioural framework in which central and local 
governments operate. It is indeed a property of the model the fact that conclusions depend 
on behavioural assumptions and are not uniquely determined. We think that this may 
paves the way to further exploring economic integration as an external constraint to the 
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5. Conclusions 
  
It is now worth summarising the main insights of the paper. Some “almost general” 
findings occur: 
 
a)  the degree of decentralisation D increases in most cases. The “almost” general 
conclusion of our paper is therefore that an increase of economic openness leads 
to a change of the vertical structure of the public sector in favour of more 
decentralisation; 
b)  the total amount of public expenditures G (central + local) always decreases. This 
would rationalise the common opinion, often empirically founded but not 
theoretically shown, that economic openness may affect the absolute size of the 
public sector. Note that this outcome would go opposite to the ‘compensation 
hypothesis’, according to which more exposure to international markets would 
lead to more public expenditures to compensate for additional risks; 
c)  the level of local taxation also always increases. This also supports the common 
observation that the role of local taxation has increased over time in many 
advanced and also less-advanced countries and that local governments have 
increasingly relied (or are called to rely) on their own resources to provide local 
public goods and services; 
d)  central public expenditures always decrease. This point is rather important if 
assessed in view of the on-going debate on the effects of globalisation on public 
finance. In particular, this finding would further weak the relevance of the 
“compensation hypothesis” (see point b); 
e)  quite interestingly, these “almost general conclusions” stem from a more variable 
behaviour of both local expenditures and grants. When they both increase, a 
result of our paper is that local expenditures increase more than grants (the 
bandwagon effect). When they both decrease, local public expenditures decrease 
less than grants (which may be thought of as a bandwagon effect on the opposite 
side). This result gives account of the common idea that more grants may 
facilitate the growth of local public expenditures, while less grants do no act in a 
symmetric way, in the sense that local public expenditures reduce to a less extent; 
f)  furthermore, our model shows that a number of results are robust to different 
behavioural attitudes by part of both central and local governments. But it makes 
explicit one often overlooked issue that may explain the significant ambiguity of 
the empirical literature on this topic, i.e. that the size and the direction of the 
response to an increase of economic openness may broadly depend on the 
institutional context. This paper exactly captures this variety of responses by 
modelling central and local attitudes towards local and central spending, 
respectively, and shows that different attitudes may differently shape the vertical 
structure of the public sector. 
 
We think that these results pave the way to further investigation of how economic 
integration may impact on the vertical structure of public sectors as a whole, rather than 
considering either the tax side or the expenditure side in isolation, and provide useful 
insights to rationalise the big controversy arisen in the empirical literature with regard to 
the impact of economic openness on the size and the structure of the public sector. 
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